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Welcome to my blog. I had an academic obligation to write every now and then in 2010, but now there's no more pressure, so it'll be much harder to get myself to to write regularly.

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On the right are navigation links.
Home is pretty self-explanatory. Fiction is a page dedicated to narrative passages that I write, fiction or not.
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Any comments can be posted on my blog or emailed to
s-unit052@hotmail.com.
--Thanks.

25.12.12

Merry Christmas!

(My blog isn't dead yet)
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25.5.12

(Draft feature article) Floods in Thailand: Merely a natural disaster or a symptom of societal strife?


In October 2011, as flood waters began to enter the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, Bangkok Governor Sukhumbhand, also a prominent opposition Democrat Party member, issued an urgent warning to the capital’s residents, urging them to evacuate despite the government’s official position that Bangkok was relatively safe, remarking “Listen to me and only me.  I will tell you when it is safe.”, seemingly in an attempt to discredit Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra who has only been in power for less than a year and is looked upon as a political novice.

At the same time, the government has been criticised harshly for mismanagement and lack of coordination in flood relief and prevention measures.  The Flood Relief Operations Centre (FROC) delivered conflicting reports and flood maps, largely due to inexperience.  A poll conducted by the ABAC Poll Research Centre based in Assumption University of Thailand via telephone interview showed that about 87 per cent of the public do not trust information from the FROC.  According to the same poll, more than seven out of ten people would rather get information about the flood from relief workers actually on the ground or from the evacuation centres themselves, as opposed to getting the information from the government.  Due to the chaos, municipal and provincial relief centres have appeared, under the jurisdictions of different ministries and officials, further tangling the chain of command.

Blatant politicking and bitter partisanship between the central government and the opposition Democrat Party among other factions has upset and hindered coordinated efforts at flood relief; opposing information and conflicting advice from different departments has confused the public as to the status of the floods and their own safety.  This has both been caused by and has fuelled an intensifying divide between the urban elite and rural population, their interests apparently supported by powerful politicians in the military together with the monarchy and the Shinawatras respectively, along with their political parties and factions.  The failure to protect and relieve the rural population, even in important agricultural and industrial zones, contrasted with the extensive efforts put into keeping the capital and the urban population dry, has been seen as an example of how national policies cater mainly to the urban elite.  At the same time, wary of yet another coup, Yingluck Shinawatra has refused to declare a state of emergency and hand more control to the military, despite the boons of army discipline and personnel mobility.  Instead, she has used a natural disaster law to place herself at the top of the chain of command.

Utilising sandbags to redirect flow within Bangkok


This apparent divide began to appear long before any natural disaster plunged Thailand into chaos.  Earlier in the twenty-first century, then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, brother of the current Prime Minister, put in place extensive policies to alleviate rural poverty and improve healthcare and infrastructure, established the rural population as a strong power base.  After his 2005 re-election victory, though, he was overthrown by the Thai military due to controversy surrounding his policy toward press freedom and alleged “policy corruption”, instituting policies to benefit companies run by his family, effectively engaging in nepotism.  While polls showed that in general the public supported the coup, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), a group opposed to the coup and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a group formed to lead demonstrations against Thaksin was formed in response.  Tensions exploded into conflict with the 2008 Thailand Political Crisis.  The violent suppression of protests led by both the UDD or “red shirts” and royalist PAD or “yellow shirts” and conflict between the two may have already been a sign of conflict between the rich and poor.  The UDD is composed mainly of the rural population and allegedly has Thaksin’s support, while the PAD is composed mainly of the upper and middle class, gets its support from various factions in the Army and urges the elites and the military to play larger roles in politics.  While the most of the chaos died down by the 2011 elections, the recent floods have re-ignited the conflict and given political opponents plenty of reasons to criticise their rivals, to the point that Yingluck seems to be struggling to keep subordinates under control at certain points.

The rivalry between the UDD and PAD and other factions remains violent.  Even as late as 2009, an assassination attempt on the PAD leader occurred.  As such, even though there may be times of normalcy, times of stress, including the recent floods and other crises, turn Thailand into a battleground of a civil cold war.

//Still referencing to sources and checking for factual errors.  Any comments or corrections are greatly appreciated!  Thanks.

20.4.12

Tolerance vs Acceptance

I refer to Mr Pravin Prakash's The intolerance of tolerance which was also edited and published in the Voices section, 14th April issue of Today.  It offers an intriguing and fresh perspective on handling the pertinent issue of racial harmony in Singapore.  Mr Prakash suggests that the entire notion of tolerance is destructive as it portrays those "tolerated" as being in the wrong.  However, I would point out a few problems in the "acceptance" approach that he advocates as a solution to the impermanence of tolerance.

First, it is impossible for acceptance, or, for that matter, tolerance, to be implemented as an absolute.  Unfortunately, it is unclear if Mr Prakash advocates acceptance as an absolute, universal rule regarding all aspects of race and religion.  On the other extreme, he could merely be putting it forward as a starting point for practices involving more practical details regarding only race.  Adopting the former would open up a huge can of worms. Not only is tolerance itself not an absolute, universal rule, trying to apply "acceptance" as Mr Prakash defines it would be very incongruent with religion.  At present, tolerance is merely a principle, not an absolute rule, as can be seen from how the government has banned certain religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses on the grounds that they refused to swear oaths of allegiance and participate in National Service.  And there is nothing really wrong with this, as one can only expect governments to support those who support the state.  At the same time, people would be hard-pressed to tolerate, or even accept, the destructive and violent beliefs of certain cults, showing that neither tolerance nor acceptance can be established as a universal, absolute rule.  Thankfully, I don't think Mr Prakash is attempting to advocate such a situation.

Secondly, having then established that acceptance can not be a universal rule, we can only consider the possibility of acceptance being used as a principle and ideal that we must work towards.  However, once religion is brought into the equation, it becomes very hard to expect people to accept.  Most of the major religions including the three abrahamic religions are monotheistic, believing the existence of one God while denying the existence of others.  Atheism denies the existence of any deities.  If one believes in a monotheistic religion or is an atheist, then how is one to celebrate differences and give mutual admiration? While secularists may dismiss the relevance of religion, the problem becomes worse when you consider that in many cases, religion defines one's sense of justice. If a Muslim believes that women should not have the equal rights as men, we cannot accept that.  Some (including other Muslims) would oppose that on grounds of universal human rights, some on the grounds of biology, some on the grounds of morality, justice and the principle of Lex Talonis and its extension, The Golden Rule, while others on the grounds of their own religious beliefs.  I would oppose such at argument on the basis of the biology, that though men and women are physiologically and to an extent psychologically different, this difference does not call for the drastic curtailing of rights that some Muslims advocate, as well as the fact that the Bible establishes the equality of all  humans.  Hence once we bring certain religions into the equation and by extension society's and individuals' sense of morality, acceptance in the light of differences becomes impossible without undermining one's own identity and beliefs, the preservation of which is a tenet of maintaining racial and religious equality.

This greatly limits the scope of practicality of an acceptance principle as it may compromise anyone's, including the state's, concepts of right and wrong.  If I believe that because I am rich or I have a certain surname that it is acceptable for me to kill people I don't like, it would be impossible for society to accept me, and rightly so.  If I believe that homosexuality is unacceptable, does that mean that I must compromise my sense of right and wrong to accept homosexuals?  And if I do, then why do others not accept my belief that homosexuality is wrong?  Acceptance as a rule poses risk to distinct racial and religious identities, which are in a way a right of freedom of belief.  It would mean that Singapore must move closer to the "melting pot" model that America has followed.

Third, there is an inherent possibility for a self-contradictory issue when we embrace acceptance.  Should we accept those who are not accepting of others?  Due to self-contradiction, acceptance can only applied selectively.  But who and what define and limit acceptance?  Acceptance itself cannot be used as justification for an action; some other reason is need to justify the need for acceptance or lack thereof.  However, once these "other reasons" become the crucial justification, why stick to a notion of acceptance when it would be more logical to simply evaluate the specific differences between races and judge when they should be accepted or resolved based on their specific merits?

Last, I really don't find any issue with the word "tolerance".  Personally, I don't see many issues of justice as a deontological or utilitarian rule-based right and wrong, so when the word "tolerance" is used, I don't see any negative connotation.  At this point, however, much of the definition comes down to one's personal worldview, so an easy resolution would be to define a new word and use that.

Laying aside the fact that this entire argument may be based on a flawed understanding of the terms "tolerance" and to a lesser extent, "acceptance", it remains that ensuring racial and religious harmony is a pertinent issue in today's society.  Apart from the status quo and its variations which are in effect in many developed countries, which I think have so far been relatively effective in preventing unnecessary conflict and discord, there are, I believe, only two real solutions, both of which have huge drawbacks.  The first is isolation, where people of different races and religions must live in complete isolation, and intergroup interactions moderated by experienced, well trained and informed mediators or completely by proxy.  However, for the small but significant rifts in society, this is still very much overkill.  The second is state indoctrination of a specific, arbitrary religion or non-religion.  The end result is in some ways similar to the first solution, but the process different.  However, beside compromising the rights of humans, it would be difficult, costly, and possibly bloody.  As such, I think that in matters regarding race and religion, the current principle of tolerance is sufficient.

Possibly the real issue in the racially insensitive outburst that Mr Prakash refers to is only one of anger management.  Had Ms Lai Shimun restrained herself for perhaps only a few minutes instead of immediately tweeting her anger, I am certain she would not be receiving flak today.  People tolerate annoying neighbours, colleagues and bosses everyday for reasons other than race or religion.  If we were extend the restraint that we exercise around these people to issues of race and religion, I believe we will find that we can live those that are different without compromising our own identities.

19.3.12

Kony 2012. Again

After reading more tweets about Kony as well as articles by both opponents and proponents of the Kony 2012 campaign, many opponents being Ugandans, I have found several issues that are important to address.  These issues are related to the interpretation of the situation in Uganda and also the intentions of Invisible Children Inc.

First, some issues arising from the short film "Kony 2012":

"Kony 2012 provides inaccurate information about the current involvement in Uganda."
Judging from both the film and the Federation of American Scientists article on Joseph Kony, Yes and No.  To the film's credit, as some proponents have pointed out rightly, it does mention that the LRA has been moving out of Uganda towards the other three countries bordering Uganda.  On the other hand, this generates a different, somewhat worse irony.  If the LRA is not highly involved in Uganda anymore, what's the point of helping the Ugandan Army?  If the Ugandan Army is the best equipped in the region, as IC Inc., has pointed out, then all the more so should the U.S. be helping its neighbours instead of itself.  Kony 2012 still gives then, a self-contradictory impression that the ones in need are Ugandans.  At the same time, FAS pointed out that military cooperation between Uganda and its neighbours is very unlikely judging from past animosity, so the Ugandan Army cannot be expected to push beyond Ugandan borders in pursuit of Kony, though of course this very reason might be used as an excuse to.

"Any awareness leading to Kony getting arrested is good. Period."
I read a comment to this effect (At least I remember the "Period." at the end) on an article criticising the aims and scope of Kony 2012.  This is a very dangerous assumption.  It's not that Kony 2012 is not good enough to be perfect; it's that Kony 2012 has the potential to cause so much damage that IC Inc. would have helped Uganda more by sitting back and doing nothing; it's net impact is negative.  The lopsided awareness may lead people, organisations and governments to spend a disproportionate amount of money on Kony 2012 instead of on more useful ways to help Ugandans. Many activists on the ground in Uganda say that stopping Kony is going to have little practical impact on the citizens' standard of living.  Even though developed countries have money, it's not infinite.  Raising a disproportionate amount of awareness about Kony is going to draw resources away from economic initiatives in Uganda that actually help people.

Furthermore, the first ten minutes of Kony 2012 is essentially tells us nothing about Uganda.  It is pretty much an egoistic rant by Russell about himself and his son.  It reminds me of advertisements.

Secondly, some issues arising from the negative responses to Kony 2012:

Many comments on anti-Kony 2012 articles and sites attempt to discredit the authors by pointing out that they, too, have done nothing for Uganda.  Others accuse the authors of being jealous of IC Inc.'s achievements.  As true as these facts are, are they enough to discredit these authors' arguments?  Because the only humanitarian work I've done was in Cambodia, does that make it wrong for me to criticise potentially misguided activists in Uganda?  True, I certainly have less experience than Russell, but it does not immediately disqualify my argument. Everybody is fallible and has the potential to make well-intentioned mistakes.  World record holders may not make the best coaches.  If it is true that my lack of involvement disqualifies me from criticising Russell, then how can U.S. citizens and Republicans criticise Obama?  He's certainly achieved much more, not only for himself, than the average American.  And as unjustified as jealousy on the part of other activists in Uganda may be, aren't their opinions worth a listen too?

Third, a few issues with the objectives of Invisible Children, Inc.

As many activists and Ugandans have said, chasing after Kony will do little to help the Ugandans.  As valuable a first step may be, this one seems to be going at a tangent.  IC Inc.'s stated objective should then be to stop Kony, not to help Uganda, as these goals may not be mutually inclusive.  Kony 2012's objective is to get people to care about International Justice and War Crimes, not Uganda.  If this is true, it then raises many questions about IC's contribution as an NGO.  Sure, stopping Kony will serve as a deterrent to future fiends and will serve justice, but in the light of greater problems in Uganda, should Uganda be the main focus of attention in the developed world?  Recognising military intervention as one of IC's main goals immediately opens up a can of worms.  The need for external military intervention in Uganda is dubious, so either IC hasn't worked that one out, or it has and has another unstated reason for advocating military intervention.  Which, frankly, is quite disturbing.

Also, the photo of IC leaders posing with weapons together with Congo soldiers shows that IC is mainly about military intervention.  If the photo is a "joke photo" as Russell claims, what is it doing as a background image on one of IC's website's pages?

Of course, I wouldn't rule out the possibility that Kony 2012 is a result of "inertia".  IC certainly has been trying to stop Kony and the LRA for a long time, and the recent sudden success has served as a natural motivation for continuing on a problem that is becoming less and less significant or relevant.  If this is the case, I can't blame Russell and the IC from continuing with their long struggle to push for Kony's arrest but still must remind them to re-evaluate the relevance of such a goal today, when the LRA is no longer a significant problem in Uganda and the annual automobile accident death toll in Uganda far exceeds the annual casualty rate from the LRA in the entirety of Central Africa.

Lastly, it seems to me that many opponents of Kony 2012 are locally-based activists and indigenous activists, while supporters from developed countries far from Uganda (at least the majority are on twitter and can be traced to countries such as Belgium, U.S.A etc.).  The opinions of the people on the ground are definitely very valuable.  This is definitely worth a look into.  If I have time I'll probably collate the authors of articles for and against Kony 2012 and post my findings.

The bottom line is, while Kony must be brought to justice, other goals should take priority lest valuable resources be wasted.  And IC, together with other NGOs, must constantly evaluate the relevancy of their objectives in order to help people, their ultimate goal and objective.  Kony 2012 has great potential to go either way, though at present it is at best irrelevant and offensive to many Ugandans.  The real challenge will be for IC Inc., and other NGOs such as The Diaspora Project, War Child International, maybe even Grameenbank to harness the slightly misaligned momentum from Kony 2012 to really help people worth helping.

Kony 2012

Kony 2012 reveals many problems associated with foreign aid in developing countries.  Badly thought out aid programmes or campaigns can cause more harm to the recipient.  Looking at Invisible Children Inc., their products and methods leads me to think that though well-intentioned, the full impact of Kony 2012 was not thought out carefully and instead may lead to:

  1. Greater U.S. military involvement in Uganda
  2. Further human rights abuses by the Ugandan Army
Furthermore, the full aid potential of Kony 2012 has not been harnessed, making the lack of in-depth impact projection glaringly obvious.  However, I have not had the time to fully research the evidence that causes me to say this, hence I shall be more restrained on this point and apologise for any inaccuracy.

The negative impacts of badly thought out aid programmes is coherent with my experience in medical missions in Cambodia.  Being unable to import Singaporean drugs, we had to buy drugs from local sources and realised that not bargaining prices down would cause the local drug prices to increase as the industry would be less competitive, harming the locals in the long run.  While there was a positive impact as it was a form of investment in the indigenous pharmaceutical industry, the point is that there was a significant negative one that we failed to take into account, and much larger NGOs must take this into account to avoid harming the recipients of their aid programs in the long run.

However, Kony 2012 completely misses the point.  While it is a valuable example of how aid agencies can raise awareness of the problems they are trying to solve, anybody who knows anything about Uganda or the Lord's Resistance Army will be able to tell you that Kony's Army is a spent force and that pursuing Kony is a largely pointless exercise.  Yes, Kony is on the top of the International Criminal Court's Wanted List and he must pay for his crimes, but catching him now is not going to help Ugandans in any big way now.  Kony is already in South Sudan; his forces have been pushed out of Uganda.  America's response of sending military advisors to Uganda is a disproportionately large response for such a small problem.

Setting aside the inappropriate solution, there are also problems with how the solution is being carried out.  Invisible Children Inc. has marketed their Kony 2012 products as a means to raise awareness.  Apart from creating the false sense that raising awareness and perhaps donating money is THE solution to ending poverty in Central Africa, it also panders to a messianic complex present not only in America but also other developed countries which, sadly, includes Singapore.  It also implies that Africans are completely unable to solve their problems and also opens up the risk that in the event that Uganda emerges as a strong nation, idealistic slacktivists, together with the charitable organisations that they support such as Invisible Children will take false credit for Uganda's progress where the hard work has been done both by the citizens of Central Africa and their governments.  Kony 2012 and Invisible Children would probably benefit Central Africa more if it outsourced all its products to small enterprises in Africa, helping the local industry grow.  Though it may mean that products would cost more, it would do much more than simply raise awareness to facilitate military action and is a much more sustainable approach.  It will require much more effort on the part of Invisible Children Inc. in both overcoming red tape and finding local enterprises to invest in, but isn't charity about going beyond the call of duty?

Reading and listening to both Ugandan locals, their reaction to Kony 2012 and local not-for-profit agencies working hard to generate growth and progress in Uganda reveals how out-of-touch Kony 2012 is from the local situation.  While some of these posts also err in making claims without evidence and being overly emotional, one can see where they are coming from, about how far from reality Kony 2012 is.  In a way these angry outpourings are also caused by a sense of unfairness, whether legitimate or not, resulting from the fact that many of these agents have dedicated their entire lives to Uganda, doing real hard work there, yet very few in the developed world know of them and support them.

Kony 2012's small redeeming factor is that it has paved the way for more awareness raising by other agencies such as Project Diaspora and War Child International.  Handled right, it may lead to a flood of sustainable initiatives in Central Africa as well as improve the quality of not-for-profit initiatives worldwide.

Unfortunately, being what may be called a "full-time student", I haven't been able to do the most in-depth research into statistics concerning this issue.  While the onus is on me to provide readers and bloggers with accurate information, I must still issue a disclaimer as to the contents of this post while I do think that this would be the reasonable conclusion to draw from the information available to me.  I will do my best in the following days to collate the sources and articles I used in the formulation of this post.